Siyasi Muslims Page 6
The imagination of a pukka Musalman as a religious, committed person survives in various spheres of postcolonial Indian public life. Be it the devoted, god-fearing Musalman of the Hindi cinema of the 1970s and/or the contemporary radical jihadists, Muslims are always portrayed as a community of religious, committed individuals. This portrayal of Islamist Muslims requires a critical assessment. We must ask two crucial sets of questions: First, what are the self-perceptions of Muslims about Islam? Do they consider themselves religiously committed? Are Muslim self-perceptions different from those of other religious communities? Second, do all Muslims in India practise Islam in the same way? Does social stratification among Muslims affect their religiosity?
Pukka Musalman and the five pillars
This stated commitment of India’s Muslims for Islam cannot be understood without discussing the basic component of Islamic religiosity: the rituals and practices. For this purpose, we can begin with the famous ‘Five Pillar theory’, which is often presented to Muslims as well as non-Muslims as the most reliable, authentic formulation of Islam. This assessment of religiosity will help us in making sense of the two most frequently used terms: namaz and roza.
The five pillars of Islam.
Let us look at the figure on the previous page. It introduces us to the five basic principles which constitute Islam. Both Shia and Sunni Islam adhere to these five pillars, though they continue to follow their own interpretations. The first pillar is called Shahada in Arabic (Shahadat in Urdu/Hindustani). It means sincerely reciting the Kalima to express commitment to the Oneness of God (Allah) and the prophethood of Muhammad. The Kalima is:
Laaa Ilaaha Illa-llaahu Muhammadur-Rasoolu-llaah
(There is none worthy of worship except Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah)
The Salat (namaz in Urdu/Persian) is the second pillar. It is about performing prayers five times in a day. These prayers are: Fajr (prayer before sunrise), Zuhr (afternoon prayer), Asr (late-afternoon prayer), Maghrib (prayer immediately after sunset) and Isha (late-evening prayer). These prayers can be offered individually; however, it is advised that Muslims offer them collectively as a congregation. The weekly Friday-afternoon prayer and the annual Eid prayers (Eid ur Fitr and Eid ul-Azha) are congressional prayers. This is followed by the third pillar, Sawm (roza in Urdu/Persian). Muslims are instructed by the Quran to observe fast in the Islamic month of Ramzan. The next two pillars are not obligatory for all Muslims. The Zakat is a type of charity that is compulsory only for rich and wealthy Muslims. Similarly, the Hajj—the annual pilgrimage to the city of Mecca—is also subject to financial capabilities of a person.
If we look closely at the sequence of these pillars of Islam, we may find three different forms of commitments: verbal, bodily and financial. Since the financial commitment is not applicable to all Muslims, verbal expressions of faith and bodily acts of worship form the structure of the innermost domain of Islamic belief systems. For instance, the belief that there is only one God, Allah, and Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah is a verbally expressed commitment. Muslims are asked to not merely recite this Kalima frequently, but to also try to imbibe it in their everyday life. The Urdu word shahadat, which means ‘to witness’, actually captures the spirit of this form of Islamic commitment.
The namaz and roza are the actual ritualistic practices which are performed through bodily actions. This inherent performative aspect transforms these two pillars of Islam into a symbol of bodily commitment. Let us first take namaz as an example to illustrate this point.
Despite the fact that the five pillars of Islam do not follow any particular hierarchy, the namaz has emerged as one of the most fundamental Islamic religious rituals. Every Muslim adult (except a few, such as children, women during their menstruation period, the terminally ill, etc.) is required to offer namaz five times a day. To perform namaz, one has to clean the visible parts of the body with water, which is called wadu (ablutions). This is followed by the actual act of namaz. The worshipper is expected to pray, either alone or in congregation, in the direction of Kaaba. This act establishes a direct relationship between the devotee’s body and the sacred sites of Islam.
The duration of namaz and the style of performing it are also related to each other. The term rakah is used to mention the duration of prayer as well as the actions prescribed in order to perform the namaz. For example, the morning namaz is called Fajr that has a total of four rakah, while the late-evening prayer called Isha has seventeen rakah. In each rakah, the worshipper follows a given cycle of actions (standing, prostrating, kneeling, sitting), which are performed with fixed narrations of Quranic and non-Quranic Islamic recitations, called duas in Arabic. The following figure shows the act of namaz.
Namaz as a performative commitment (Hanafi Maslak).
Since namaz is an obligatory ritual, it serves two functions—it is a responsibility to face Allah five times a day in person and, at the same time, it is the mode by which a worshipper is expected to establish a balance between bodily actions and his/her thought processes. In other words, a worshipper has not only to execute namaz in a given format of actions with a set recitation of texts, but at the same time, he/she is expected to put himself/herself in an imaginary state of mind where Allah is supposedly looking at him/her.
These performative aspects of namaz are quite theatrical. This is a theatre-like situation where an actor has not only to perform through dialogues and bodily actions but also put his/her mind in the character which he/she is trying to enact. Thus, spirituality, Islamic thought seems to suggest, can be achieved if and only if an equilibrium is established between the performance of bodily acts and the imaginations prescribed behind these acts.
This is also applicable to the act of roza. It is obligatory (farz) for adult Muslims to observe a fast during the month of Ramzan (except those who are suffering from an illness, those who are travelling, those cannot fast due to old age and women who are pregnant, breastfeeding or menstruating). Observing roza from dawn to sunset is not just about refraining from food, drink, smoking and sexual intercourse. It is expected from the rozedar (the person who observes the fast) that he/she must not get involved in any sinful behaviour and must observe his/her roza as an instrument to purify his/her spiritual engagement with Allah. In this sense, the physical act of fasting is a means to achieve moral–spiritual ends.
Three broad inferences can be drawn from the discussion:
There is an agreement that the five pillars constitute Islam as a religion and all sects of Islam recognize them as fundamental features. However, they continue to offer varied interpretations of these pillars to legitimize their own modes of rituals and practices. This may be the reason why Salat becomes namaz and Sawm becomes roza for Urdu/Persian-speaking Muslim communities. In other words, the Five Pillar theory does not disregard the religious plurality within Islam.
There are three kinds of commitments a Muslims is expected to make: verbal, bodily and financial. Since bodily commitments are the most visible form of religious practices, the namaz and roza have emerged as the most fundamental aspects of Islamic religiosity.
The bodily commitment, expressed through the practices of namaz and roza, cannot be completed without absolute devotion to the ideas and principles associated with these acts.
The Five Pillar theory, we must remember, offers us an ideal picture of Islam. It does not tell us the multiple modes in which these aspects of religion are formed, reformed and even negated in the everyday life of Muslims in various contexts. To understand this dilemma between the theory of Islam and the practices of Muslims, we need to go beyond this textual description of Islam and look at the perceptions and views of Muslims about it. The question is: Do Muslims consider themselves pukka Musalman in contemporary India?
Pukka Musalman versus ‘somewhat religious’ Muslims
Sample survey as a method, in my view, is the most appropriate technique to evaluate the level of religiosity among Muslims in India for two very practical re
asons. First, the survey method is useful in reaching out to a large number of Muslims who live in different geographical locations. Second, the survey method can also help in evaluating the consistency and divergence of opinions, views and perceptions. However, it all depends on the rigour of methodology, especially the sampling exercise.
Keeping these considerations in mind, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS)-Lokniti’s Religious Attitude and Practices Survey 2015—an all-India study covering twenty-one states, with a sample size of 5681 respondents—explored the ‘pukka Musalman’ phenomenon.
The findings of the survey were quite instructive. Muslims do not think that they are ‘very religious’. Instead, most of them feel that they may well be described as ‘somewhat religious’ (see Table 1 on p. 40). This Muslim self-perception cannot simply be called a reflection of minority psyche.
In fact, two other religious minorities—Sikhs and Christians—appear more confident than Muslims in asserting their religiosity. The Indian Christian community actually emerges as the most religious social group of the country.
On the contrary, one finds a striking similarity between Hindu and Muslim opinion. Despite significant differences between the modes of worship and the nature of religiosity between Hinduism and Islamic traditions, the majority of Hindu and Muslim respondents do not consider themselves sufficiently religious.
This somewhat religious attitude of Muslims must be seen in a wider perspective. Contemporary Islamic religious debates, especially among Sunnis, are more concerned about the growing worldly outlook of Muslims. The decline of Islamic pre-eminence in the contemporary world is seen as a direct outcome of non-Islamic values and practices. Although the meanings of the true Islamic path and the modes to achieve it have been an unsettled issue, there is a consensus that to ‘go back to the original Islam’ would be the ultimate solution. Take, for example, the Tablighi Jamaat, which has emerged as one of the most powerful forms of ritualistic Islam in the last three decades. The adherents of the Jamaat are encouraged to give up politics to devote themselves completely to preparing Muslims for the next world. This is why the Jamaat invites Muslims for ‘deen ki mehnat’ (struggle to consolidate faith).
This overtly apolitical form of contemporary Islam functions in two different ways. Muslims are told that their spiritual beliefs as well as religious practices are not adequately Islamic; therefore, they must give up unnecessary worldly considerations and consolidate their Islamic commitment. At the same time, they are also asked to create a balance between deen and duniya (religion and this world), following the example of the early Islamic society of Prophet Muhammad. In this sense, Islam is introduced as a possibility, which would persuade somewhat religious Muslims into becoming very religious ones in the course of time.
The practice of religion by Muslims further substantiates this point. Namaz and roza are not observed uniformly by all Muslims. These practices as rituals, no doubt, are highly diversified (especially the namaz) and every sect has its own tradition, but it is also true that Muslims do not follow them on a regular basis. There is even a crucial distinction between OBC (Other Backward Class) Muslims and Muslims from the general category. OBC Muslims appear to practise the religion more than Muslim upper-caste members do, which again goes against established public wisdom that universalizes Islam and Muslims uncritically!
Obviously, it is not possible to make any grand observation about the societal attitudes of Muslim communities on the basis of these findings. But it could certainly be argued that Islamic religiosities do not entirely determine the everyday life of Indian Muslim communities. That is the reason why they describe themselves as ‘somewhat religious’. The changing nature of Islamic religiosities also plays a role. Islam refashions itself in order to adjust with the requirements of the secular state. The evocation of ‘deen ki mehnat’ by Tablighi Jamaat, instead of direct politics, is a good example of this Islamic recasting. We shall discuss this aspect in greater detail in the next chapter.
Nevertheless, the tussle between common Muslims and the religious elite has always been an important aspect of Islamic religious discourse in India. This is what poet Altaf Hussain Hali identified back in the 1890s. He wrote:
Barbe jis se nafrat vob taqreer karni
Jigar jis se sha bon vob tebrir karni
Gunahagaar bandon ki tebqreer karni
Musalman bhai ki takfeer karni
Ye bai aalimon ka bamaare tareeqa
Ye hai baadiyon ka hammare saleeqa
(Make speeches that will only hatred enhance
Write tracts which violate all decent norms
Insult and degrade, never pardon perchance
Call Muslims ‘you kafirs’, swagger and strut
This is the method of our religious crusaders
Our leaders in this are the shrewdest of traders.)
Koi mas’ala poochhne un se jaaye
To gardan pe baar-e-garaan le kea aye
Agar badnaseebi se shak us mein laaye
To qate’ee khitab abl-e-dozakh ka paaye
Agar aiteraaz uska nikla zabaan se
To aana salaamat hai dushwaar wan se.
(If a question arises which one asks them about
Then with a dead weight on his neck he returns
And if the unfortunate posts a doubt
Then doubtless to Hell he is straightaway sent
If a word of dissent ever escapes his lips
Then to safely return is not part of this trip.)4
Table 1: How religious are Indians?
Source: Religious Attitudes and Practices Survey 2015, by CSDS-Lokniti Data Unit
Figures are in percentages
Table 2: The Islam(s) of Muslims
Source: Religious Attitudes and Practices Survey 2015, CSDS-Lokniti Data Unit
Figures are in percentages
3
‘Islamization’ since Independence!
‘Dawat-e-Islam’ and/or ‘conversion’?
In 1981, an unusual event took place in a small village in Tamil Nadu, which actually redefined the public image of Indian Islam in an unprecedented manner. Around 180 Pallan Dalit families of Meenakshipuram—a hamlet of the Thenpoti panchayat in the Tenkasi taluk of Tirunelveli district of Tamil Nadu—decided to embrace Islam. This conversion, as various detailed ethnographic studies of this event show, was a highly localized affair. It was found that the upward mobility of the Scheduled Caste (SC) communities of Meenakshipuram and the ongoing resistance to the practice of untouchability at the local level were the two main reasons behind this mass conversion.1 However, the local experience of the event somehow evaporated gradually and the Meenakshipuram episode transformed into a civilizational conflict between Islam and Hinduism.
As expected, the most interesting reaction came from the RSS. An official resolution passed by the RSS in 1982 asserts that:
Many underhand tactics being adopted by the Muslim proselytizers such as aggravation and exploitation of ‘untouchability’, the lure of so-called equality in Islam [. . .] as against the discrimination in the Hindu fold, instigation of police against the Harijans, promises of security in the Muslim fold because of political favouritism, and dangling of lucrative jobs in oil-rich Muslim countries [. . .] Experience of past history amply bears out the fact that such conversions do not merely imply a simple change in way of worship, but destruction of national culture and sentiments, growth of separatist and secessionist tendencies and extra-territorial loyalties and communal animosities and flare-ups as well, which directly strike at the roots of our national integrity and security. As such, the problem of such conversions should be a matter of serious concern for all our patriotic and nationalist people.2
The resolution makes two interesting points. Questioning the practice of Islamic conversion, it is argued that untouchability is exploited by the Muslim preachers to mislead Dalits. It is also alleged that the converted Dalits were promised jobs in rich Muslim countries; hence, the act of conversi
on could not entirely be called ‘spiritual’.
The outcome of conversion is the second problematic area. The resolution says that conversion to Islam in India will destroy the ‘national culture’ of the country. By this definition of national culture, the Indian version of Islam cannot be called an authentic Indian faith system. Therefore, we are told that the conversion to Islam will inevitably lead to separatism, communalism and extraterritorial loyalties. It implies that if someone becomes Muslim (even though forcibly!), he/she would imbibe the ideology of anti-Indian separatism and his/her future conduct would always be determined by his/her faith in Islam. To counter these anti-national tendencies, the resolution asks the government to implement a strict anti-conversion law.
It is true that these kind of polemical documents are mainly published and disseminated by Hindu nationalists to carve a space for themselves in the public sphere. But the popular discussion on the aggressive conversion of non-Muslims into the Islamic fold cannot entirely be called the invention of Hindutva politics. The colonial history of India, which presented India’s past as a battleground of religious wars, actually popularized this story of Islamization. The belief that Muslims came from ‘outside’ and forcibly converted Hindus in the medieval period concretized as a fact and contributed a lot in the making of modern Muslim identities in the subcontinent. The central component of Islamic faith—dawat (or what is also known as ‘Dawat-e-Islam’ in popular Hindustani, which means inviting individuals and communities to embrace Islam)—thus emerges as a contentious issue.